Indeterminism Ltd.

Workshop with Helen Beebee: “Causality and Laws”
University of Konstanz, Germany
4. – 5.11.2015

Wednesday, 4.11.2015  (room: V 1001)
14:00-15:15h: Helen Beebee, “Agent probabilities, causation, free will”
15:15-15:30h: coffee break
15:30-16:30h: Verena Wagner, “Humean indeterminism”
16:30-16:45h: coffee break
16:45-18:00h: Marius Backmann, “Inferences to and from necessary connections”

Thursday, 5.11.2015  (room: K 503)
09:00-10:15h: TALK SKIPPED!
10:15-10:30h: coffee break
10:30-11:45h: Tobias Henschen, “Causal powers: the Kantian alternative”
11:45-12:00h: coffee break
12:00-13:15h: Wolfgang Spohn, “Ramsey’s laws of nature”

Attendance is free, all welcome!

Abstracts

Marius Backmann, “Inferences to and from necessary connections”
In my talk, I will argue that attempts by necessitarians to justify induction by introducing necessary connections fail: they do not justify induction, but try (and fail) to dissolve the problem by reducing inductive inferences to deductive ones. In trying to justify inductive inferences by eliminating any uncertainty that comes with their ampliative character, the necessitarians employ a standard for justification that is unlikely to ever be met.

Helen Beebee, “Agent probabilities, causation, free will”
While the paper is about a problem in evidential decision theory, its broader aims connect directly with issues surrounding Humeanism about causation.

Tobias Henschen, “Causal powers: the Kantian alternative”
The paper is supposed to show that a (so far neglected) neo-Kantian position on causal powers (one that understands the concept of power as a pure and a priori concept) is less vulnerable to neo-Humean objections than the decidedly anti-Humean positions endorsed by Ellis, Molnar etc.

Wolfgang Spohn, “Ramsey’s laws of nature”
Ramsey says: “Laws are not either”, (namely propositions, and he refers to deterministic laws). Rather: “The general belief consists in (a) a general enunciation, (b) a habit of singular belief.” This view finds a straightforward ranking-theoretic explication, which at the same time extends de Finetti’s philosophy of probability to the deterministic realm.